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INTRODUCTION
The American University Law Review was prophetic in choosing
"Taxing Remote Sales in the Digital Age" as its symposium issue. The
obstacle to any meaningful sales tax reform of the digital economy is
the U.S. Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.' In Quill, the Court held that the Commerce Clause requires
a vendor to have a physical presence in a state before it can be
required to collect that state's use tax.2 That requirement has
subsequently been roundly criticized. Most notably, in March 2015,
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in Direct
Marketing Association v. BrohP that sent shock waves through the
profession,' urging the Court to revisit Quill's legal underpinnings.'
Part ofJustice Kennedy's concurrence is reprinted below because it
serves as a wonderful, short overview of the issues dealt with at the
Law Review's Symposium and in some of the articles in this Issue.
This Article supports Justice Kennedy by arguing that the Quill
decision was intellectually dishonest, politically motivated, and based
on shaky precedent. If the Supreme Court has the opportunity, it
should abandon Quill.
I. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
In Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl, the Supreme Court unanimously
held that the Tax Injunction Act' did not bar the federal courts from
hearing challenges to a Colorado statute requiring out-of-state
retailers to notify customers of their sales and use tax requirements
and to report tax-related information to customers and to the state.
The Court remanded the case and "express[ed] no view on the
1. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
2. Id. at 309-19. For a discussion of the use tax, see RiCHARD D. PoMp, STATE
AND LOcAL TAXATION 6-39 to 6-43 (8th ed. 2015).
3. 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
4. See, e.g., Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Online Retailers Win Big in Use-Tax
Dispute-For Now, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 4, 2015, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2015/03/opinion-analysis-online-retailers-win-big-in-use-tax-dispute-for-now (writing
that Justice Kennedy's "exciting" concurrence will prompt states to pass new use
taxes and will surprise many corporate attorneys).
5. Direct Mktg. Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134-35 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
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merits."7 Justice Kennedy, however, took the opportunity to write
separately to critique the Quill decision, highlight the states' interests
in taxing Internet commerce, and invite a future challenge to that
case. Part of his concurrence follows:
Almost half a century ago, this Court determined that, under its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, [s]tates cannot require a business
to collect use taxes-which are the equivalent of sales taxes for out-
of-state purchases-if the business does not have a physical
presence in the [s]tate. Use taxes are still due, but under Bellas Hess
they must be collected from and paid by the customer, not the out-
of-state seller.
Twenty-five years later, the Court relied on stare decisis to
reaffirm the physical presence requirement and to reject attempts
to require a mail-order business to collect and pay use taxes. This
was despite the fact that under the more recent and refined test
elaborated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, "contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result"
as the Court had reached in Bellas Hess. In other words, the Quill
majority acknowledged the prospect that its conclusion was wrong
when the case was decided. Still, the Court determined vendors
who had no physical presence in a [s]tate did not have the
"substantial nexus with the taxing state" necessary to impose tax-
collection duties under the Commerce Clause. Three Justices
concurred in the judgment, stating their votes to uphold the rule
of Bellas Hess were based on stare decisis alone. This further
underscores the tenuous nature of that holding-a holding now
inflicting extreme harm and unfairness on the [s] tates.
In Quill, the Court should have taken the opportunity to
reevaluate Bellas Hess not only in light of Complete Auto but also in
view of the dramatic technological and social changes that had
taken place in our increasingly interconnected economy. There is
a powerful case to be made that a retailer doing extensive business
within a [s] tate has a sufficiently "substantial nexus" to justify
imposing some minor tax-collection duty, even if that business is
done through mail or the Internet. After all, "interstate commerce
may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes." This argument
has grown stronger, and the cause more urgent, with time. When
the Court decided Quill, mail-order sales in the United States
totaled $180 billion. But in 1992, the Internet was in its infancy.
By 2008, e-commerce sales alone totaled $3.16 trillion per year in
the United States.
7. Direct Mktg. Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134.
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Because of Quill and Bellas Hess, [s]tates have been unable to
collect many of the taxes due on these purchases. California, for
example, has estimated that it is able to collect only about [four
percent] of the use taxes due on sales from out-of-state vendors.
The result has been a startling revenue shortfall in many [s]tates,
with concomitant unfairness to local retailers and their customers
who do pay taxes at the register. The facts of this case exemplify
that trend: Colorado's losses in 2012 are estimated to be around
$170 million. States' education systems, healthcare services, and
infrastructure are weakened as a resulti8'
8. Due to the dynamic changes taking place among remote vendors, anything
but very current revenue estimates are likely to overstate the amount of use taxes that
are not being collected. For example, Amazon's relatively new business model of
shipping orders either on the day the order is received or the very next day requires
having distribution centers close to major metropolitan areas. See Jillian D'Onfro,
Here Are All of Amazon's Warehouses in the US, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 24, 2015, 1:48 PM),
http://businessinsider.com/how-many-fulfillment-centers-does-amazon-have-in-the-
us-2015-3. Amazon typically places these centers in separate entities-LLCs, LLPs, or
C Corporations. Amy Martinez, Amazon.com Fights Sales Taxes After Getting Other Breaks,
SEATrLE TIMES (Jan. 24, 2011, 6:59 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/
amazoncom-fights-sales-taxes-after-getting-other-breaks. Those entities obviously
have nexus with the states in which the center is located. At one time, Amazon
apparently took the position that it did not have nexus with a state merely because a
separate entity that it controlled did have nexus. Id. Some of the revenue estimates
bandied about reflect that position. Amazon now seems to have abandoned that
argument and collects use tax in states where it has distribution centers owned by
controlled entities, which means that it collects for nearly three quarters of the
population. See POMP, supra note 2, at 9-66. Any meaningful revenue estimate has to
capture that significant change.
Based on a survey of the websites of the largest hybrids in the country, that is, those
enterprises that have both dot.coms and retail stores in related entities, this Author
concludes that they are collecting use tax on sales made in any state in which their
retail stores are located. Part of the explanation is that some states have passed
legislation requiring them to collect use tax. See id. at 9-71 to 9-74. The lack of
litigation over these statutes uggests that the major hybrids have made the same
decision as Amazon, discussed supra, and have decided to collect rather than litigate.
Their legal position is even weaker than Amazon's because the dot.coms often
provide that a purchase from them can be returned to, or picked up from, one of
their related retail stores. There may also be a shared proprietary credit card, shared
email addresses used for marketing purposes by both the dot.coms and the retail
stores, and proprietary gift cards sold at the retail stores that can be used for sales
made from the dot.coms. And, of course, the dot.coms and the retail stores will have
similar names and trademarks. See N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't v.
Barnesandnoble.com LLC, 303 P.3d 824, 829 (N.M. 2013), affg 283 P.3d 298 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2012) (holding that these common facts, which described the relationship
between Barnesandnoble.com and its Barnes and Noble retail stores owned by
separate entities, created nexus for the dot.com, requiring it to collect the New
1118
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The Internet has caused far-reaching systemic and structural
changes in the economy, and, indeed, in many other societal
dimensions. Although online businesses may not have a physical
presence in some [s]tates, the Web has, in many ways, brought the
average American closer to most major retailers. A connection to a
shopper's favorite store is a click away-regardless of how close or
far the nearest storefront. Today buyers have almost instant access
to most retailers via cell phones, tablets, and laptops. As a result, a
business may be present in a [s]tate in a meaningful way without
that presence being physical in the traditional sense of the term.
Given these changes in technology and consumer sophistication,
it is unwise to delay any longer a reconsideration of the Court's
holding in Quill. A case questionable even when decided, Quill
now harms [s]tates to a degree far greater than could have been
anticipated earlier. It should be left in place only if a powerful
showing can be made that its rationale is still correct.
The instant case does not raise this issue in a manner
appropriate for the Court to address it. It does provide, however,
the means to note the importance of reconsidering doubtful
authority. The legal system should find an appropriate case for this
Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess."
Few law reviews can cite the endorsement of a Supreme Court
Justice in support of their wisdom in selecting a symposium topic."'
The Law Review is also to be complimented for having Senator Heidi
Heitkamp-a named party in the Quill case when she was the North
Dakota Tax Commissioner and today that State's U.S. Senator-
Mexico gross receipts tax). These seismic changes in the tax landscape have reduced
the amount of revenue at stake in overturning Quill
9. Direct Mktg. Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). Much has been made of the fact that no other Justice joined Kennedy's
concurrence. SeeJonathan Randles, Kennedy's Call to Reconsider Quill Could Spawn Test
Case, IAw360 (Mar. 3, 2015, 6:39 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/627210/
kennedy-s-call-to-reconsider-quill-could-spawn-test-case. There are several possible
explanations, however, for this fact. The Court's composition has changed
dramatically since Quill was decided. Only Justices Kennedy and Thomas of the
current Court were on the Quill Court. Perhaps the six currentJustices named to the
Court since Quill were less familiar with the issue and had no opinion on the merits.
It is also possible that some Justices did not join Justice Kennedy's concurrence
because they believed it was inappropriate, as it had nothing to do with the merits of
the case before them-DMA. Others may have disagreed with the concurrence and
wish to leave Quill undisturbed. This Article leaves it to others to read the tea leaves.
10. And few law reviews are as gracious, supportive, and delightful as the
Symposium editors. They are a real credit to the American University Washington
College of Law. Special thanks are especially due to Ryan Sims, whom Jones Day is
lucky to be getting as an associate starting in the Fall of 2016.
1119
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
deliver the opening address at the Symposium. She was spellbinding,
not only because of her magnetic charm, but also because of the
"inside baseball" insights she shared as the architect and mastermind
of the case, but who unfortunately did not-but should have-argued
it before the Supreme Court."
Many, many articles have discussed Quill. A computer search of
only law review articles, notes, and comments that have "Quilt' in
their titles indicates there are more than seventy." This number is
understated because this simple search ignores treatises,
monographs, and other articles that discuss Quill, but do not name
the case in their titles. Almost all of these articles, (as well as the
speakers at the Symposium), agree with the sentiments expressed by
Justice Kennedy. It is possible that Justice Kennedy might have been
influenced by some of this literature."
Quill reaffirmed Bellas Hess. And Bellas Hess was informed by Miller
Brothers. Hence, this Article starts by reexamining Miller Brothers.
That case is best remembered today for one of the most quoted
statements in state taxation: "due process requires some definite link,
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property
or transaction it seeks to tax."" What is forgotten, or perhaps never
appreciated, is the pivotal role that case played in the development of
the Court's use tax jurisprudence.
Unfortunately for the states, Justice Robert H. Jackson, one of the
most aggressive defenders of Justice Frankfurter's philosophy that
the states could not tax interstate commerce, authored the case.'5
11. The case was argued by the North Dakota Attorney General, Nicholas Spaeth,
who ran (unsuccessfully) for Governor of North Dakota in 1992. See Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 300 (1992); Nicholas Spaeth 1950-2014, N.D. Sup. CT.
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2014), https://ndcourts.gov/court/news/spaethn.htm.
12. A Westlaw search for <advanced: TI(Quill)> in Law Reviews & Journals
returns seventy-one entries.
13. See, e.g., H. Beau Baez III, Taxing Internet Sales: Trying to Make a Two-Thousand-
Year-Old jurisdiction Test Work in the Dot-Com Economy, 64 TAx LAw. 807, 848 (2011)
(arguing that either the Supreme Court or Congress should change Quilts
substantial nexus requirement); Geoffrey E. Weyl, Comment, Quibbling with Quill:
Are States Powerless in Enforcing Sales and Use Tax-Related Obligations on Out-of-State
Retailers?, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 253, 281 (2012) (stating that applying Quill to "pure"
e-retailers is not always fair).
14. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
15. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson were close friends and Justice Frankfurter
was said to have had a great influence overJackson's opinions. See H. N. HIRSCH, THE
ENIGMA OF FELix FRANKFURTER 187-88 (1981). Justice Frankfurter has also been
described as influencing Justices Minton and Burton, who perhaps not surprisingly
joined with Jackson in Miller Brothers. See KiM EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WIAM J.
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In the hands of a different Justice, this Symposium might not
have been necessary.
After revisiting Miller Brothers, this Article examines the role that
case played in Bellas Hess. This Article then briefly discusses Quill,
essentially showing why it was a political decision, intellectually
dishonest, and unworthy of great precedential value. Finally, this
Article concludes by introducing the pieces that follow in this Issue.
II. MILLER BROTHERS V. MARYLAND
Figure 1: Miller Brothers' Store
BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 88, 100 (1993). Justice
Frankfurter's feuds with Justices Warren, Black, and Douglas, who all dissented in Miller
Brother, were well known. See EISLER, supra, at 105, 128; H. N. HIRSCH, supra, at 189-90.
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Figure 2: Welcome to Delaware
A. The Facts
Miller Brothers sold furniture at its Wilmington, Delaware store.
It did not take orders by mail or telephone." Delaware has never had
a sales tax, a fact that the state happily markets.' Residents of
neighboring Maryland, which adopted a sales tax in 1947, shopped at
Miller Brothers' store.' Presumably, many of these purchasers were
attracted by the lack of a Delaware sales tax, and although they were
liable for the Maryland use tax when they brought the goods home,
they probably failed to pay it either through ignorance or the
knowledge that the risk of discovery was nearly nonexistent.2 0
Miller Brothers used its own vehicle to transport many purchases to
the Maryland customers' homes in Maryland." Some purchases
were delivered to Maryland by common carrier. Others were
16. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341.
17. Id.
18. See POMP, supra note 2, at 6-39 to 6-40; supra Figure 2.
19. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341.
20. See POMP, supra note 2, at 6-41; Steven Walters, just 1% of Taxpayers Report
Unpaid Sales Tax, GAZETTEXTRA (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.gazettextra.com/news/
2012/feb/13/just-1-taxpayers-report-unpaid-sales-tax (reporting that a mere one
percent of Wisconsin tax payers complied with that state's law requiring its citizens to
report sales tax owed on online and out-of-state purchases); see also Adam B.
Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 148 (2016) (arguing that
"economic, moral, and psychological" factors contribute to states' inability to collect
use taxes, and suggesting alternative methods to enforce such taxes).
21. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341, 349 n.4 (stipulation by the parties).
1122 [Vol. 65:1115
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"cash-and-carry, "2 that is, the customer paid for the purchase and
carried it out of the store.
Miller Brothers did not collect the Maryland use tax on any of its
sales to Maryland customers. Maryland filed suit in its own courts,
claiming that Miller Brothers should have collected the Maryland use
tax on its sales to Maryland customers. Maryland obtained
jurisdiction over Miller Brothers by seizing its vehicle in the State."
Miller Brothers argued that Maryland was seeking to apply its use tax
law to a company outside of its borders, in contravention of the Due
Process Clause.' Maryland's highest court held that Miller Brothers was
liable for the use tax on the goods delivered to Maryland purchasers, but
apparently not on the cash and carry sales.2 5
1. Nature of Miller Brothers' advertising
On review, the Supreme Court analyzed whether Miller Brothers
"by its acts or course of dealing, ha[d] subjected itself to the taxing
power of Maryland," specifically by advertising to Maryland
consumers." On this issue, the parties stipulated how and where
Miller Brothers advertised. Since January 1, 1951, Miller Brothers
engaged in no radio or television advertising anywhere.2 ' Before
January 1, 1951, Miller Brothers had purchased limited radio and
television advertising in Delaware.2 9 No ad "made an appeal for out-
of-state business or in any way was designed directly or indirectly to
appeal particularly to Maryland residents.""' In fact, Miller Brothers'
radio slogan was "Furniture Fashion Makers for Delaware.""' The
parties also stipulated that Miller Brothers advertised regularly in
22. Id. at 342; id. at 358 (Douglas,J., dissenting). Although the record is silent, a
fair inference is that Miller Brothers used its own vehicle to deliver purchases within
a certain radius of its store and employed a common carrier to make deliveries to
customers outside that radius.
23. Id. at 341 (majority opinion). The lower court referred to the vehicle that
was attached by Maryland as a station wagon, 95 A.2d 286, 288 (Md. 1953), rev'd, 347
U.S. 340 (1954); Justice Jackson refers to it as a truck. 347 U.S. at 341.
24. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341.
25. Miller Bros. Co. v. State, 95 A.2d at 292. "These two appeals test the
constitutionality of the Maryland Use Tax Act... as applied to firniture sold by
appellant, Miller Brothers Company, a Delaware corporation, at its store in Delaware
and delivered to purchasers residing in Maiyland." Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
26. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344.
27. Id. at 341, 349 n.4.
28. Id.
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three Wilmington, Delaware newspapers, which "undoubtedly" had
"some" circulation in Maryland." The newspaper advertisements did
not, however, specifically mention or target Maryland residents."
The parties also stipulated that four times each year, Miller
Brothers mailed advertisements to prior customers whose names and
addresses it had on file." No advertising was sent to only Maryland
purchasers. To be sure, these advertisements might have attracted
additional business from prior customers, some of whom lived in
Maryland; however, Miller Brothers never used any mail "for the
specific purpose of attracting Maryland buyers.""
B. The Majority's Opinion
In a very short 5-4 opinion," full of questionable, bordering on
outrageous, statements," Justice Jackson held in favor of Miller
Brothers." The Court reasoned that, although its past decisions were
not always clear about the grounds on which a tax was upheld," they
all respected one time-honored concept: "that due process requires
some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.""o Because the
Court recently held that a state like Maryland could not have
imposed its sales tax on the sales made by a company like Miller
Brothers," it "would be a strange law that would make [an] appellant
more vulnerable to liability for another's tax than to a tax on itself.""2
1. Justice Jackson's eccentric view of the use tax
In his majority opinion, Justice Jackson claimed that the Court was





36. JusticeJackson was joined byJustices Reed, Frankfurter, Burton, and Minton.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 43-48, 55-56, 62-63, 74 and accompanying text.
38. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 346.
39. Id. at 344.
40. Id. at 344-45.
41. McLeod v.J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
42. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 346.
43. Id. at 343, 352 n.5 (citing MAURICE CRIz, THE USE TAX: ITS HISTORY,
ADMINISTRATION, AND ECONOMIc EFFECTS 1 (1941); ROBERT MURRAY HAIG & CARL
SHOUP, THE SALES TAX IN THE AMERICAN STATES 83 (1934); JEROME HELLERSTEIN,
STATE AND LocAL TAXATION 4-12, 338 (1952)). The first cited source, The Use Tax,
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This statement may have been acceptable in the 1930s, but certainly
not in 1954, when the opinion was issued. States began to adopt
general sales and use taxes shortly after the Great Depression began
in 1929."' By 1937, more than twenty states had adopted them, and
thirty states had general sales and use taxes by the time Justice
Jackson claimed they were "relatively new" and "experimental."1 5
But his apparent hostility did not stop there. He proceeded to
refer to the effects of the use tax as a "protective tariff."` If that were
actually the proper way to view the use tax, it would be
unconstitutional. State tariffs are "the quintessential evil targeted by
the dormant Commerce Clause.""7  Unfortunately, the Court had
already rejected this characterization of the use tax in 1937."
Justice Jackson had better success in rehabilitating his dissent in
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of the State of Iowa,"' a
companion case to McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.5" Both cases were
authored by Justice Frankfurters' and handed down the same day.
Dilworth and General Trading involved nearly identical transactions:
an out-of-state vendor employed sales persons who traveled to the
market state, solicited orders for goods, sent the orders back to the
home office for acceptance or rejection, and if accepted, shipped the
goods to the market state.' In Dilworth, the Court held that the
was published in 1941, and the page cited has nothing to do with Justice Jackson's
proposition. The second source, The Sales Tax in the American States, was published in
1934 and could not supportJackson's tatement in 1954. In any event, the cited page is
irrelevant to his assertion. The third source, State and Local Taxation (an early edition of
the now standard treatise in the area), although closer in time to 1954, not only does not
supportJusticeJackson, but also can be read for the opposite conclusion.
44. POMP, supra note 2, at 6-5.
45. Id.
46. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 343.
47. Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792 (2015) (Maryland
personal tax scheme that effectively taxed income earned outside the state at a
higher rate than income earned inside the state held to be unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause as having the effects of a tariff).
48. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937) (a use tax is not
equivalent to a tariff and does not violate the Commerce Clause).
49. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
50. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
51. For more information about the relationship between Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
52. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328 (striking down an Arkansas sales tax on the type of
transaction described in the text); General Trading, 322 U.S. at 336 (upholding the
market state's (Iowa) right to have its use tax collected by the out-of-state vendor on
the type of transaction described in the text).
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market state could not levy its sales tax on the transaction because the
sale occurred beyond its borders." In General Trading, however, the
Court held that on the same facts as in Dilworth, the vendor would
have to collect the market state's use tax." The effect of Justice
Frankfurter's holding in these companion cases was exactly the
"strangeness" that Justice Jackson railed against in Miller Brothers.55
Had Justice Jackson's views prevailed in General Trading, a vendor
engaged in the very common fact pattern in the case would not be
subject to the market state's sales tax and would not have to collect
that state's use tax. Assuming the purchaser did not voluntarily pay
the use tax, the transaction would, as a practical matter, be tax free.
Indeed, this was the likely result in Miller Brothers.
The common business model described in the text was intended to avoid income
taxation by the market state. The prevailing constitutional jurisprudence of the day
viewed this type of transaction as constituting non-taxable interstate commerce. See
Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 495 (1959) (rejecting
this view and subjecting interstate commerce to a net income tax under certain
conditions). Portland Cement Co. upset many businesses' reliance interests, and
multistate corporations immediately pressured Congress for relief. In response,
Congress adopted Public Law No. 86-272, intended as a temporary measure pending
a Congressional study, immunizing corporations from market state income taxation
under certain circumstances. Act of September 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat.
555. One of those circumstances involved the Dilworth and General Trading fact
patterns. Accordingly, Public Law No. 86-272 restored the protection that existed
prior to Portland Cement Co. See POMP, supra note 2, at 11-12 to 11-26.
53. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330.
54. Gen. Trading, 322 U.S. at 337-38.
55. In Dilworth, Justice Frankfurter stated that "[w]hatever might be the fate of
[the market state's use] tax were it before us, the not too short answer is that [the
market state] has chosen not to impose such a use tax, as its Supreme Court so
emphatically found." 322 U.S. at 330 (emphasis added). Of course, the use tax was
before the Court in the companion case of General Trading, decided the very same day
by Justice Frankfurter.
56. Unlike Justice Jackson's opinion in Miller Bros., his dissent in General Trading
does not use the term "strange" but rather explains that the majority held that "a
state has power to make a tax collector of one whom it has no power to tax." Gen.
Trading, 322 U.S. at 339. Jackson described General Trading as a case where the out-
of-state merchant entered the market state through traveling sales agents to conduct
continuous local solicitation followed by delivery of goods to the customer. Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 317 U.S. 310, 316 (1951). "But there is a wide gulf between
this type of active and aggressive operation within a taxing state and the occasional
delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other than the
incidental effects of general advertising." Id. at 346-47 (emphasis added). He never
defends his use of "occasional," which is contradicted by the large number of sales
delivered by Miller Brothers in its own vehicle. See id. at 340, 341, 350 n.4.
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2. Did Maryland overreach by including the cash and carry sales?
The stipulation between the parties made it clear that the cash and
carry sales were less than a third of the sales delivered in Miller
Brothers' own vehicle. Specifically, from July 1, 1947 through
December 31, 1951, Miller Brothers made at least $2500 in cash and
carry sales, compared to at least $8000 of sales delivered in its own
vehicle, and at least $1500 of sales delivered by a common carrier.
There were three problems with requiring Miller Brothers to
collect use tax on the cash and carry sales. First, the cash and carry
sales had the weakest connection to Maryland. Even assuming that
the store knew which of its purchasers were Maryland residents,
which is what the stipulation in the case assumes,"59 the missing link is
whether the goods would necessarily be used in that state. For
example, a Maryland customer may have used the purchase at a
summer home in a Delaware beach community, given it to her child
attending school in Delaware, or taken it to another state altogether.
The record was apparently devoid of evidence regarding the
destination of the cash and carry transactions, which would be
unsurprising because this fact would be irrelevant to the store.
Second, while a court might have analyzed the cash and carry sales
separately without tainting the analysis of the sales that were
delivered in Miller Brothers' own vehicle-Maryland's strongest
case-there was always the risk (and one that actually materialized, as
Justice Jackson's opinion indicates), that the cash and carry sales
would "poison" the other transactions. In other words, the weakness
in the cash and carry analysis would fatally distract a court from
analyzing Maryland's strongest argument, Miller Brothers
delivering goods in its own vehicle. Justice Jackson used the small
tail of the "cash-and-carry" to wag the big dog of the deliveries in
Miller Brothers' vehicle.
Third, this risk was not worth taking because even winning on the
cash and carry issue would probably not have led to much use tax
ever being collected. It is hard to imagine that the Court would have
required Miller Brothers to collect the Maryland use tax on sales to
Maryland residents regardless of where the goods were to be used, or
that the Court would have endorsed an irrebuttable presumption that
a purchase in Delaware by a Maryland resident would be used in
57. See Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341, 350 n.4.
58. Id. at 341, 350-51 n.4.
59. Id. at 341, 350 n.4.
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Maryland.' Realistically, the most that Maryland could have hoped
for was a decision that if the goods were to be used in Maryland, then
Miller Brothers would have to collect the Maryland use tax. But how
would Miller Brothers determine place of intended use?
Obviously, a clerk could ask the purchaser, but after the first few
articles appeared in the regional papers and on radio and television
about the tax consequences of answering that question, dishonest
customers would not admit they were going to use the goods in
Maryland. One can also imagine a clerk asking the purchaser about
intended use with a wink and a nod, even providing advice on how to
answer the question. Perhaps taxpayers were more honest in 1954
when the decision was handed down, but given the ease with which
today's consumers flaunt their use tax obligation on Internet or
catalog purchases," one can be a tad skeptical about how much
Maryland use tax would have actually been collected.
The cash and carry sales allowed Justice Jackson to make the
technical point that:
at the time of the sale, no one is liable for a Maryland use tax. That
liability arises only upon importation of the merchandise to the
taxing state, an event which occurs after the sale is complete and
one as to which the vendor may have no control or even
knowledge, at least as to merchandise carried away by the buyer.62
That point is valid for the cash and carry sales because at best, the
store knew only the address of the buyers, but not where they were taking
the merchandise. Clearly Miller Brothers knew where it was delivering the
goods in its own vehicle, and it knew where it was shipping goods using
common carriers. Nevertheless, the cash and carry sales tainted the
analysis in the hands of a hostile justice likeJustice Jackson."
60. See id. at 342 (a state's power to tax is limited to transactions occurring within
its borders). Conceivably, Maryland could have asked the Court to require Miller
Brothers to collect the Maryland use tax on all purchases by Maryland consumers,
leaving it up to them to apply for a refund if the good was not ultimately used in
Maryland. See infra note 64. There was no empirical evidence in the record linking
the purchaser's home state with the state of use.
61. See supra Part I (reprinting Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Direct
Marketing).
62. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added).
63. The cash and carry issue in Miller Brothers cast a long shadow. See, e.g., Nat'l
Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1977)
(emphasizing that Miller Brothers did not know the destination of the cash and carry
sales); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 212 (1960) (describing the deliveries in
Miller Brothers as "occasional"). But Justice Blackmun, who concurred in National
Geographic Society, emphasized that the heart of Miller Brothers was the deliveries in the
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Today, it is taken for granted that an out-of-state vendor that has
nexus with the market state can be required to collect the use tax if it
is arranging for shipment into that state even though, as a technical
matter, no use tax is owed by the purchaser at the time of sale.
Under those circumstances, the use tax is merely being pre-collected
on the very strong assumption that it will shortly be owed; if it turns
out that no use tax is ultimately owed, a refund would be in order."'
With the benefit of hindsight (and maybe even without that
benefit), it appears that including the cash and carry sales had a
serious downside risk with little upside potential, and probably
constituted a litigating blunder.
C. The Dissent
Justice Douglas, authoring a four-person dissent,'- asserted with no
explanation that "[a]ppellant did not sell cash-and-carry without
knowledge of the destination of the goods.""" At best, Justice Douglas
might have meant that the appellant knew whether the purchasers
had Maryland addresses. Purchasers paying by check presumably
would have to provide some form of supporting identification like a
driver's license, which would show a state-specific address. Moreover,
Miller Brothers apparently collected customers' mailing addresses
even in the case of the "cash-and-carry" sales for its subsequent
advertising circulars.67 The stipulation indicates that Miller Brothers
sent mail about four times a year to "everyone who has purchased
from [the store] and whose name and address is on the [store's]
records.""" To compile this list, Miller Brothers no doubt made an
effort to gather everyone's addresses."' Because the stipulation
identified the amount of purchases by Maryland residents,70 the store
apparently had information on the addresses of the purchasers (at
least those willing to provide such information).
store's own vehicle, and there was "no uncertainty as to the destination of those
goods." 430 U.S. at 562 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun would have
overniled Miller Brothers. Id. at 563.
64. See generally 2 JOHN C. HEALY & MICHAEL S. SCHADEWALD, MULTISTATE
CORPORATE TAx GUIDE 16123, 16146 (2015).
65. ChiefJustice Warren and Justices Black and Clark joined in Douglas' dissent.
Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 357 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 358.
67. Id. at 350 n.4 (majority opinion); see id. at 358 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting
that Miller Brothers was aware of the destination of even cash-and-carry sales).
68. Id. at 341, 350 n.4 (majority opinion).
69. The record apparently was silent on how successftl these efforts were.
70. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341, 350-51 n.4.
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Justice Jackson wrote that Maryland claimed it was entitled to use
taxes because Miller Brothers sent circulars to all former customers,
including those in Maryland." This might explain why Justice
Douglas thought that Miller Brothers knew the addresses of all the
cash and carry purchasers. Nonetheless, that does not answer the
more relevant question about where the goods were used. Perhaps
Justice Douglas assumed, quite reasonably, that a Maryland purchaser
would use the good in Maryland.
Justice Douglas was on stronger grounds when he stated that
"[t]his is not a case of a minimal contact between a vendor and the
collecting [s]tate.... [I] ts delivery truck was not in Maryland upon a
casual, nonrecurring visit. Rather [, there has been a course of
conduct in which the appellant has regularly injected advertising into
media reaching Maryland consumers and regularly effected deliveries
within Maryland by its own delivery trucks and by common carriers."72
He correctly focused on the stipulation. The parties stipulated that
for over four-and-a-half years, Miller Brothers had sold "at least
$12,000 worth of merchandise . . . to Maryland purchasers for
Maryland use"; and Miller Brothers itself had delivered
approximately two-thirds of this merchandise to Maryland.7 ' Despite
these telling, stipulated statistics, Justice Jackson described the delivery of
goods as "occasional."" While the stipulation makes clear that Miller
71. Id. at 341-42. The "all" is inconsistent with the stipulation. A gap must have existed
between allof the store's former customers and those whose addresses it had on file.
72. Id. at 358 (Douglas,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 358 n.2.
74. The characterization of the deliveries as "occasional" allowed Justice Jackson
to distinguish Miller Brothers from General Trading. See id. at 346-47.
The record was silent on how many deliveries actually occurred. A fair assumption is
that the deliveries took place throughout the year. Hypothetically, it is possible, even
if highly unlikely, that the vehicle made one big delivery on one day only.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in National Geographic Society v. California Board of
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 562 (1977), sided with the dissent in Miller Brothers.
I am not at all convinced that the Court's facile distinction of Miller Bros. Co.
v. Maryland, on the ground that in that case "the seller obviously could not
know whether the goods sold over the counter in Delaware were transported
to Maryland prior to their use," and that there was a "lack of certainty that
the merchandise sold over the counter to Maryland customers in Delaware
was transported to Maryland prior to its use," is a proper and acceptable
distinction. I thought that one of the factual difficulties of Miller [Brothers],
in the focus of the present case, was the Delaware seller's own delivery of
goods to Maryland, some by common carrier and some by the seller's own truck.
Indeed, Miller Bro[thers] stipulated that during the taxable period, it delivered or
paid a common carrier to deliver $9500 worth of merchandise to customers in
Maryland ($8000 through use of its truck, $1500 by common carrier). Miller
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Brothers in fact delivered a majority of these sales to Maryland,
subsequent cases blindly acceptJustice Jackson's characterization.15
Of course, given Justice Jackson's apparent hostility to Maryland's
position, it would not have been relevant how he characterized the
delivery of the goods. In fact, if Maryland were going to lose no
matter what, the states were better off going forward in having the
deliveries misdescribed as "occasional" because that narrowed the
holding of the case and its precedential value. Future cases holding for
the state would be able to dismiss Miller Brothers as involving a fairly weak
connection with Maryland: the occasionaldelivery of goods.7 '
D. An Alternative Opinion
In the hands of a less hostile Justice than Justice Jackson, the case
might have taken a different turn. One can only imagine howJustice
Rutledge, who left the Court a few years before Miller Brothers, would
have decided it. He would have likely upheld the collection of the
Maryland use tax, at least on the goods delivered to Maryland
customers, provided some relief would be extended for any sales tax
paid on the transaction."
At the time of Miller Brothers, the Court and commentators did not
think that nexus had a different meaning under the Due Process
Clause than under the Commerce Clause-Quill would later invent
that bifurcation. Miller Brothers had a vehicle in Maryland
presumably on a recurring basis."' It sent advertising circulars to
Bro[thers] exhibited no uncertainty as to the destination of those goods.
Id. at 562 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (citing National Geographic,
430 U.S. at 559, 561 (majority opinion); Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341-42, 350-51 n.5).
75. The only exception isjustice Blackmun's concurrence in National Geographic. See
supra note 74.
76. In Bellas Hess, Illinois adopted this strategy (to no avail) of marginalizing the
deliveries by endorsing Justice Jackson's description as "occasional." Professor Cox,
representing Bellas Hess, rejected Justice Jackson's characterization. See infra notes
111-14 and accompanying text.
77. For Justice Rutledge's visionary views, see Int'l Harvester Co. v. Dep't of
Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-06, 326-27 (1992)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Justice Rutledge and
deferring to his reasoning in Memphis Nat. Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948)
(Rutledge, J., concurring)); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 259 (1946) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring). Justice Rutledge would have almost certainly upheld the collection of the
Maryland use tax on sales that were delivered in Miller Brothers' vehicle into Maryland.
78. See Int'l Harvester Co., 322 U.S. at 360 (Rutledge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
79. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 341-42.
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former customers with Maryland addresses-not all of them, to be
sure, but those for whom it had information80-and the Court had
previously held that where a sale occurred was irrelevant to
determining whether the vendor must collect use tax for the market
state." It would not have taken a heroic effort to hold that the
minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe for due process
nexus was satisfied."
Sending advertising into Maryland could have been equated with
sending in drummers, which had been previously held to constitute
nexus."8  As the Supreme Court later explained, "In 'modern
commercial life' it matters little that such solicitation is accomplished
by a deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers: [t]he
requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation's
lack of physical presence in the taxing [sitate."" Miller Brothers'
vehicle received the same type of benefits-fire and police
protection-that the Court later found to satisfy the Due Process Clause
in National Geographic." In short, in the hands of someone more
sympathetic to the states, Miller Brothers might have reached in 1954 the
same due process holding that was eventually set forth in Quill Had it
done so, the Court's jurisprudence would have taken a different path
and Bellas Hess could well have been decided in favor of the states.
80. Id. at 350 n.4; see also supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
81. Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944); see abo
Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 563 (1977)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The Court appears to find an additional distinction in
the fact that the goods in Miller Bros. were 'sold to residents of Maryland at Miller's
Delaware store.' If the Court intends thereby to rest a distinction on the fact that the
sales were made out of State, I am at a loss to follow its reasoning. By definition, a use
tax is imposed only on sales made out of [s] tate. In short, Miller Bros. is not so easily
explained away.").
82. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing that a
forum state may only exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state vendor with
which it has "minimum contacts").
83. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1992).
84. Id.
85. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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III. BELLAS HESS, INC. V. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
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Figure 3: Cover of a Bellas Hess CataloK
A. The Facts
Bellas Hess was based in Missouri and conducted a pure mail-order
business." It had no sales representatives, personnel, offices, or
property of any kind in the State of Illinois." It used the U.S. mail
and common carriers to fulfill orders from Illinois residents.88
Twice a year, Bellas Hess mailed catalogues to its active or recent
customers, including those in Illinois.` The company also
supplemented this mailing with advertising "flyers" that were
occasionally mailed to both past and potential customers."
86. Nat'I Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 753-54 (1967).
87. Id. at 754. According to the dissent, Bellas Hess had retail stores in wholly
owned subsidiaries but presumably none in Illinois. Id. at 760 (FortasJ., dissenting).
Had there been any retail stores in Illinois, the Court would have confronted the
issue of entity isolation. See infra note 193.
88. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754-55.
89. Id. at 754.
90. Id. at 754-55.
[Bellas Hess] was one of the big-five general merchandise catalogs that
thrived during the 20th century-the others were Sears, Roebuck, Alden's,
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Under Illinois law, Bellas Hess was considered a retailer
maintaining a place of business in the state because it was soliciting orders
through catalogues or other advertising." Accordingly, the company was
obligated to collect the Illinois use tax, which it did not do."
When Illinois brought suit before the Supreme Court for unpaid
use taxes, Bellas Hess retained Professor Archibald Cox." Cox was
tall and ramrod straight, regal, bow-tied, and buzz-cut." He was a
Harvard Law Professor, a Boston Brahmin, an early supporter of
then-Senator John Kennedy, and the head of a Cambridge brain trust
in Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign." When Kennedy became
President, he appointed Cox as Solicitor General." From 1961 to
1965, Cox argued numerous landmark cases," including Baker v.
Spiegel[,] and Montgomery Ward. But none deserves its place in history
more than Bellas Hess.
The company was founded in the late 1800s as National Cloak & Suit and
renamed National Bellas Hess around 1910, as folklore has it. It was
located between Washington, Morton[,] and Barrow streets in New York's
Greenwich Village. "We have no agents or branch stores," it said in its 1920-21
fall-winter catalog. "We sell only direct from this catalog and anyone claiming
to represent us is an imposter." But what a catalog it was. The whole book was
illustrated and included many color pages. There was no photography.
Many items seem quaint today-like sleeping caps, union suits, corsets
and "knickerbockers" (the short pants that schoolboys couldn't wait to
outgrow). Some were expensive. An embroidered crepe blouse went for
$9.98. An "ultra smart style" woman's suit could cost up to $47.95-no
small amount in 1920. Ladies' shoes could be bought for around $4.98.
Except for sweaters and work shirts, there [was not] much for men. By
1928, the firm now known as National Bellas Hess had annual sales of $40
million, and this number grew by $17 million when it acquired a
competitor: The Charles Williams Stores.
Ray Schultz, The Ballad of Bellas Hess, MULTICHANNEL MERCHANT (June 1, 2008, 9:30
PM), http://multichannelmerchant.com/mcm/the-ballad-of-bellas-hess-01 062008.
Despite winning the right not to collect the use tax on sales into states in which it
had no physical presence and thus gain a competitive advantage over in-state
retailers, Bellas Hess declared bankniptcy in 1974. Clayton Reed, Bellas Hess Fate in
Court, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 27, 1974, at 5-B.
91. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 755.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 753.





97. Archibald Cox Oral History, COLUM. U. LIBRS., http://www.columbia.edu/
cu/lweb/digital/collections/oral_hist/cox (last visited May 17, 2016).
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Carr," Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,"" Reynolds v. Sims, .o
Peterson v. City of Greenville,'"' Massiah v. United States,' 12 Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, "3 United States v. Seeger, "" and Zemel v.
Rush. "' He was well-known to the Court, with a reputation for
fairness and integrity."' It is apparent from listening to the oral
argument in Bellas Hess that the Justices well respected him.'0
Not surprisingly, Miller Brothers played a prominent role in the
briefing and oral argument of Bellas Hess. Taxpayers had few
Supreme Court victories upholding their right not to collect the
use tax,'4)8 so even if Miller Brothers was hardly a model of analytical
rigor, as well as a 5-4 decision, it was nonetheless a recent-and
favorable-precedent.
98. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
99. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
100. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
101. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
102. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
103. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
104. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
105. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
106. Andrew C. Esensten, Watergate Prosecutor Cox Dies at 92, HARY. CRmIsoN (June 7,
2004), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2004/6/7/watergate-prosecutor-cox-dies-at-92.
107. Cox received soft-ball questions during oral argument such as the following:
Justice Black-"It's an old company, though? It's an old company." Cox-"It's an old
company, yes." Justice Black-"I remember my mother use[d] that." Oral Argument
at 27:26, Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (No. 241),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1966/241. At the time of Bellas Hess' oral argument in
1967, Cox was already highly regarded in legal and political circles. After Attorney
General Elliot Richardson appointed him as the special prosecutor in Watergate,
Cox became a public and treasured figure. President Nixon later fired Cox in the
"Saturday-night Massacre" after he refused to withdraw a subpoena for the infamous
White House tapes. Watergate and the White House: The 'Third-Rate Burglary' That Toppled
a President, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 8, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2014/08/08/watergate-and-the-white-house-the-third-rate-burglary-
that-toppled-a-president. For a detailed study of Cox's remarkable life, see KEN
GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1997). Professor Cox's
irrelevant and insignificant efforts include teaching this Author constitutional law.
As far as memory serves, we did not study Bellas Hess.
108. Taxpayers were forced to collect the use tax in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362
U.S. 207, 211-12 (1960); Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 338
(1944); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 366 (1941); Felt & Tarrant
Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 66-67 (1939). Until Bellas Hess in 1967, Miller
Brothers was the aberration.
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In his brief and at oral argument, Professor Cox argued that Miller
Brothers "should govern the present case"o0 and emphasized that
Miller Brothers "made regular deliveries in Maryland in its own truck
driven by its own employees.""o He rejected Justice Jackson's
characterization of Miller Brothers' deliveries in Maryland as
"occasional."' Instead, Cox recharacterized the deliveries, (more
accurately) as "regular.""' By underscoring, rather than trivializing,
the store's deliveries (as well as its advertising),"' Professor Cox was
able to state at oral argument: "If continuous regular advertising plus
delivery with your own trucks is not enough to make jurisdiction,....
then surely [there cannot be jurisdiction] where you don't make
deliver[ies] with your own truck[. T]ake away that point of contact[,]
and the advertising alone cannot be a sufficient jurisdiction." He argued
that the dissenting Justices in Miller, too, would agree with him in Bellas
Hess: they only would have found Miller Brothers liable because of its
deliveries, but in contrast, Bellas Hess did not make any such deliveries."
Illinois responded at oral argument by noting Bellas Hess's
"tremendous reliance" upon Miller Brothers and then rejected Cox's
characterization of the deliveries in Miller Brothers as "regular," citing
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,"' in support of Justice Jackson's
characterization."' Illinois had every reason to endorse Justice
109. Brief for Appellant at 18, Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S.
753 (1967) (No. 241).
110. Id.
111. See supra note 74 (noting that Justice Jackson stated that Miller Brothers only
made "occasional" deliveries).
112. Oral Argument at 13:09, Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S.
753 (1967) (No. 241), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1966/241.
113. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
114. Oral Argument at 13:09, 13:54, Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue,
386 U.S. 753 (1967) (No. 241), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1966/241.
115. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
116. Oral Argument at 55:51, Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S..753
(1967) (No. 241), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1966/241. In Scripto, the Court held that
ten part-time manufacturer representatives working on a commission basis soliciting sales
for Scripto in Florida constituted nexus, requiring Scripto to collect the use tax. 362 U.S.
at 209, 212-13. Not surprisingly, the taxpayer relied heavily on Miller Brothers, which was
decided just six years earlier. In rejecting this reliance, the Court stated:
Appellant earnestly contends that [Miller Brothers] is to the contrary. We
think not. Miller had no solicitors in Maryland; there was no "exploitation of
the consumer market"; no regular, systematic displaying of its products by
catalogs, samples or the like. But, on the contrary, the goods on which
Maryland sought to force Miller to collect its tax were sold to residents of
Maryland when personally present at Miller's store in Delaware. True, there
was an "occasional" delivery of such purchases by Miller into Maryland, and
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Jackson's description of the deliveries as "occasional.""'7  Further,
Illinois attempted to limit the significance of Miller Brothers by
emphasizing that buyers went from Maryland to Delaware and that
Miller Brothers did not know where the goods were to be used."'
Illinois's goal was to minimize the precedential impact of the case
to show how different Bellas Hess was. Illinois and Justice Jackson
were thus odd allies. Cox had the opposite goal, to show how
substantial Miller Brothers' contacts were with Maryland and that if
those could not justify collecting the Maryland use tax, then how
could Bellas Hess's less substantial contacts do so?
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Clark, Harlan, Brennan, and White."" The
opinion is unimaginative and hardly intellectually bold. Justice
Stewart summarized the Court's earlier opinions as involving vendors
having either real or personal property in the market state." The
common link among these cases was that the "out-of-state seller was
plainly accorded the protection and services of the taxing [s]tate." '2
The Court, however, never explained why Miller Brothers' delivery in
its own vehicle did not benefit from the protection and services
provided by Maryland.12 2  After all, the vehicle traveled on roads
it did occasionally mail notices of special sales to former customers; but
Marylanders went to Delaware to make purchases-Miller did not go to
Maryland for sales. Moreover, it was impossible for Miller to determine that
goods sold for cash to a customer over the counter at its store in Delaware
were to be used and enjoyed in Maryland. This led the Court to conclude
that Miller would be made "more vulnerable to liability for another's tax
than to a tax on itself." In view of these considerations, we conclude that the
"minimum connections" not present in Miller are more than sufficient here.
Id. at 212 (citations omitted).
117. Oral Argument at 56:08, Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S.
753 (1967) (No. 241), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1966/241.
118. Id. at 56:48.
119. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 753, 760 (1967).
120. Id. at 754.
121. Id. at 757.
122. Id. at 758; see Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551,
561 (1977) (stating that the taxpayer's offices in the market state benefited from "fire
and police protection, and the like").
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supported by state funding and presumably could have received
assistance from Maryland's police and firefighters while in Maryland.'"
But the Court refused to re-examine its precedents:
In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens
on [Bellas Hess] in this case, we would have to repudiate totally the
sharp distinction which these and other decisions have drawn
between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property
within a [s] tate, and those who do no more than communicate with
customers in the [s] tate by mail or common carrier as part of a
general interstate business.... [I]t is difficult to conceive of
commercial transactions more exclusively interstate in character
than the mail order transactions here involved.2 1
The Court also struck a theme that it would later reinforce in Quill.
"[I]f Illinois [could] impose such [use tax] burdens, so can every
other [s]tate, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school
district, and every other political subdivision throughout the
Nation."'25 How this burden would be reduced if there were ten part-
time independent solicitors in the state was unaddressed.2 ' The
majority essentially accepted Cox's framing of the issue. And like
Quill twenty-five years later, the Bellas Hess Court was influenced by
considerations of stare decisis.
C. The Dissent
Justice Fortas wrote a stinging dissent, joined by justices Black and
Douglas.12 The dissent started by noting the size of Bellas Hess's
sales nationwide in 1961 of $60 million and accounts receivable of
$15.5 million.1 28  During the fifteen-month audit period (dates
unspecified) Bellas Hess's sales in Illinois were over $2 million. 2
None of these figures was cited by the majority. The dissent
123. In National Geographic, the Court described the taxpayer's offices in California
as benefitting from "fire and police protection, and the like." 430 U.S. at 561. The
same could have been said about Miller Brothers' vehicle in Maryland.
124. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-59.
125. Id. at 759.
126. One commentator argues that the reference to burdens on interstate
commerce was meant to be "simply atmospheric." Charles Rothfeld, Mail-Order Sales
and State Jurisdiction to Tax, 53 TAx NOTES 1405, 1410 (1991).
127. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 760-61. It is unclear whether the $60 million figure included accounts
receivable.
129. Id. at 761.
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attributed this "substantial volume" to "twice-a-year catalogue
mailings" and "intermediate smaller 'sales books' or 'flyers."""'o
The dissent underscored another point that the majority ignored:
"A substantial part of Bellas Hess' [s] sales [were] on credit."'-' That
fact allowed the dissent to conclude that doubtless "this large-scale,
systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois
consumer market is a sufficient 'nexus' to require Bellas Hess to
collect from Illinois customers and to remit the use tax, especially
when coupled with the use of the credit resources of residents of
Illinois."'" Bellas Hess was not simply using the facilities of interstate
commerce to serve customers in Illinois. Rather, "Bellas Hess
enjoy[ed] the benefits of, and profits from the facilities nurtured by,
the State of Illinois as fully as if it were a retail store or maintained
salesmen therein."' Accordingly, Bellas Hess was obligated to
collect the Illinois use tax.'
The dissent stressed another point ignored by the majority, and
one that has become a rallying cry for overruling Quill: the
unfairness of exempting remote vendors but taxing their in-state
competitors. The dissent argued that excusing Bellas Hess from
having to collect the use tax "burden[ed] and penalize[d]" domestic
retailers that were obligated to collect the tax'T:
While this advantage to out-of-state sellers is tolerable and a
necessary constitutional consequence where the sales are
occasional, minor and sporadic and not the result of a calculated,
systematic exploitation of the market, it certainly should not be
extended to instances where the out-of-state company is engaged in
exploiting the local market on a regular, systematic, large-scale basis.3 6
The dissent underscored yet a final point about how to evaluate the
burden on Bellas Hess if made to collect use taxes across the
country.' The dissent compared the compliance burden on Bellas
Hess with that of a local retailer, concluding that the burdens are
comparable. By doing this comparison state-by-state, the dissent
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 761-62.
133. Id. (raising the issue of credit sales sua sponte, as it had not been raised by
Illinois or by Bellas Hess; the latter, of course, would have had no reason to have
done so).
134. Id. at 762.
135. Id. at 763.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 766.
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determined that Bellas Hess's burden was no more significant than
what local retailers experienced:
It is hardly worth remarking that appellant's expressions of
consternation and alarm at the burden which the mechanics of
compliance with use tax obligations would place upon it and
others similarly situated should not give us pause. The burden is
no greater than that placed upon local retailers by comparable
sales tax obligations.138
Although there is certainly a burden that comes with collecting taxes,
the dissent explained, the burden experienced by a mail order house
located in another state, such as the appellant, is no greater than the
burden imposed "on an enterprise in the same [s]tate which accepts
orders by mail; and it is, indeed, hardly more of a burden than it is on
any ordinary retail store in the taxing [s] tate."39
Finally, anticipating what critics of Quill would later assert, the
dissent noted that technology has reduced whatever burdens remote
vendors complain about.'" It attacked the majority's concern that
"administrative and record keeping requirements could 'entangle'
appellant's interstate business in a welter of complicated obligations"
as "vastly underestimatting] the skill of contemporary man and his
machines.""' The dissent claimed that a "realistic approach to the facts
of [Bellas Hess's] business" showed that the state could impose use taxes
on the out-of-state vendor without resulting in an undue burden."'
The difference between the majority and dissent was stark. The
majority opinion was orthodox in its reasoning, unimaginative, and
timid. No one could accuse the majority of advancing the Court's
jurisprudence. In sharp contrast, the dissent raised themes the
majority ignored (and that were not raised by Illinois)-themes that
have come to dominate the current debate over Quill. Twenty-five
years later in Quill, the Court had the opportunity to endorse the





142. Id. at 760.
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IV. QUILL V. NORTH DAKOTA
A. Overview
Little need exists to review in depth the facts or the decision in
Quill, which is one of the most written about and discussed cases in
state taxation."13 Certainly everyone at the Symposium seemed
familiar with the case, and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Direct
Marketing Association ("DMA") can serve as a review.'" Quill
reaffirmed Bellas Hess and endorsed two bright-line rules. The first
rule, drawn from National Geographic,"'5 is that a remote seller must
collect the market state's use tax if it has a physical presence there.""
Under the second bright-line rule, drawn from Bellas Hess, a remote
seller does not have nexus with a state if it does not have a physical
presence in the state and "whose only connection with customers in
the [taxing s]tate is by common carrier or the United States mail."1 7
As Justice Kennedy's concurrence in DMA indicates, the Quill
Court was reluctant to reaffirm Bellas Hess."' The Quill majority
eventually affirmed the decision in deference to the reliance interests
of the mail-order industry and principles of stare decisis."' The
Court perceived an obligation to protect the reliance interests and
settled expectations of the direct-marketing industry, which had
partially flourished, according to the Court, as a result of Bellas
Hess.151' How much the competitive advantage of not collecting the
use tax mattered to the growth of the industry is a tricky empirical
143. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (noting the volume of legal
commentary on the case).
144. See supra Part I (providing the concurrence in part).
145. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
146. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992) (finding that "a small
sales force, plant, or office" may constitute "presence in the taxing [s]tate").
147. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758).
148. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). As part of its ambivalence in affirming Bellas Hess, the Quill Court
noted that "contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the
same result." Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined injustice
Scalia's concurrence that the Court could have upheld the rule from Bellas Hess on
the basis of stare decisis alone. Id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
149. Quill, 504 U.S. at 316--17 (majority opinion).
150. Id. at 303, 316 (stating that the mail-order business had grown "'from a
relatively inconsequential market niche' in 1967 to a 'goliath' with annual sales...
'of $183.3 billion in 1989"' (quoting State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208-09
(N.D. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 298 (1992))).
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question, but the Court implicitly assumed it was significant.5 ' The
Court realized that the underlying jurisprudence would support a
decision in favor of North Dakota, but felt that Congress was better
suited for dealing with the problems that would accompany
overruling Bellas Hess, especially that of retroactivity.
B. Congressional Response
Reflecting the ambivalence about the wisdom of its decision, the
Court extended a clear invitation to Congress to eliminate or modify
the Bellas Hess rule.' The Court stated that the Due Process Clause
did not prohibit Congress from "decid [ing] whether, when, and to
what extent the [s]tates may... collect use taxes."' Many earlier
legislative attempts to overrule Bellas Hess failed, partially based on
the fear that any legislation would violate the Due Process Clause.'
After Quil the Senate finally passed the Marketplace Fairness Act in
2013,'" but it languished in the House and was never enacted.'15  The
bill has been reintroduced in the Senate and referred to Committee.'
The politics for passing the Marketplace Fairness Act are brutal, as
most voters (and many politicians) might see the bill as imposing a
new tax that takes away their perceived God-given right to shop on
the Internet tax-free, rather than viewing the bill as more akin to the
withholding that is routinely accepted in the income tax on wages.
Legislators may increase the likelihood of passage by pairing the bill
151. Id. at 316. The growth of the industry was certainly facilitated by the advent
of national credit cards, such as MasterCard and Visa, innovation of the 800-
telephone call, and expansion of the United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal
Express. At the time of writing, this Author knows of no attempt by analysts to
separate out the effect of these developments on the industry from the non-
collection of the use tax.
152. Id. at 318 ("No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on
interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions.").
153. Id.
154. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013); see S. 743 (113th):
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, GovTRACK.us, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
113/s743 (last visited May 17, 2016) (providing the legislative history of S. 743).
155. S. 743 (113th): Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, GovTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 113/s743 (last visited May 17, 2016).
156. See S. 743-MadetplaceFairness Act of 2013, CONGRESS.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/743/related-bills (last visited May 17, 2016)
(providing the status of legislation related to S. 743 pending in Congress).
157. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015); see S. 698-
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/senate-bill/698/related-bills (last visited May 17, 2016) (providing the
status of legislation pending in Congress).
1142 [Vol. 65:1115
2016] REVISITING MILLER BROTHERS, BELLAS HESS, AND QUILL
with pro-taxpayer bills that can blunt or neutralize opposition.
Perhaps Justice Kennedy understood that the Quill Court's invitation
for Congressional reform' 5  was politically unrealistic when he
suggested judicial redress as an alternative.5 ' That the Senate passed
158. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (quoting the Quillcourt).
159. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (encouraging the legal system to find a case that would allow the "Court
to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess"). Such a case would involve imposing a use tax
collection on remote sellers lacking a physical presence in the market state. Alabama
was the first state to acceptJustice Kennedy's invitation. It adopted Regulation 810-6-
2-.90.03, which applies to transactions occurring on and afterJanuary 1, 2016. The
regulation requires certain out-of-state retailers to collect Alabama sales tax on sales
of tangible personal property into Alabama, even if the retailer lacks a physical
presence in the state. Officials in the Alabama tax department have said they
welcome a challenge to Quill. See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 810-6-2-.90.03 (2016); Clark R.
Calhoun & Matthew P. Hedstrom, Ask and Ye Shall Receive, Justice Kennedy: The
Alabama DOR Has Proposed a Regulation to Challenge Quill, IPT INSIDER (Sept. 2015), at
13-14, http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/9725da83-be8e-484a-b9ed-
e7526a99f215/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/13d3278c-3fc9-4bfc-8628-
c241d79ee209/Sales-Use%2OTax%20Article.pdf (highlighting the key concepts of
the Alabama regulation and noting the Alabama Department of Revenue "appears
ready to challenge the well-settle rule of Quilland provide Justice Kennedy with a test
case"). On June 8, 2016, Newegg Inc. filed a Notice of Appeal in the Alabama Tax
Tribunal challenging an assessment by the Alabama Department of Revenue.
Stephen P. Kranz et al., Alabama Issues Remote Sellers Use Tax Assessment, Newegg, Inc.
Appeals, INSIDE SALT BLOC (June 15, 2016), http://www.insidesalt.com/2016/06/
alabama-issues-remote-sellers-use-tax-assessments-newegg-inc-appeals. Apparently, the
assessment is based solely on Newegg's significant sales to Alabama customers. Id.
(reporting that Newegg makes more than $250,000 in sales to customers in Alabama).
South Dakota adopted a law, effective May 1, 2016, which is also a frontal attack on
Quill. S.B. 106, 2016 Sess. (S.D. 2016). A statement of legislative purpose provides
that there is "an urgent need for the Supreme Court of the United States to
reconsider [the Quill] doctrine." Id. § 8(8). Litigation is already underway with
Newegg, Overstock.com, Systemax, Wayfair, American Catalog Mailers, and
Netchoice. Sandra Guy, South Dakota Sues Four Big Online Retailers Over Sales Taxes,
INTERNET RETAILER (Apr. 29, 2016,1:40 PM), https://www.internetretailer.com/2016/
04/29/south-dakota-sues-four-online-retailers-over-sales-taxes. These efforts by
Alabama and South Dakota are criticized in George S. Isaacson & Matthew P.
Schaefer, The Problems with State Efforts to KillQuill, 80 ST. TAx NOTES 623 (2016).
Tennessee is proposing a regulation that will require out-of-state vendors to collect
that state's rise tax even if they do not satisfy Quill. See Stephen P. Kranz et al.,
Breaking News: Tennessee Submits Proposed Economic Nexus Regulation for Publication,
INSIDE SALT BLOG (June 16, 2016), http://www.insidesalt.com/2016/06/breaking-
news-tennessee-submits-proposed-economic-nexus-regulation-for-publication. Other
states are considering similar action. Andrew Yates, States Continue to Challenge Quill's
Physical Presence Standard, ALSTON & BIRD TAx BLOG (Feb. 9, 2016),
http://www.alstontax.com/1314-2 (discussing the National Conference of State
Legislatures' "new, provocative attack on Quill').
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a bill at all, finally accepting the Quill Court's invitation, might
encourage some on the Court to hold off granting certiorari for now,
waiting to evaluate the outcome of the November elections and their
effect on the passage of legislation.
C. The Bifurcation of Nexus
Quill was a political decision. Its novel approach of bifurcating the
concept of nexus so that it had a different meaning under the Due
Process Clause from its meaning under the Commerce Clause
allowed the Court to accomplish two goals: clearing the way for
Congressional intervention while protecting the reliance interests of
the mail order industry. By holding that due process nexus was
satisfied, it provided Congress with clear authority for overturning
QuilL Previously, opponents of federal intervention were telling
Congress that Bella Hess held that the Due Process Clause prevented
out-of-state vendors with no physical presence in a state from having
to collect that state's use tax. Opponents then argued that Congress
could not legislate on matters of due process, even if economic issues
were concerned, and thus was powerless to overturn Bellas Hess. Quill
put that fear to rest and simultaneously held that Commerce Clause
nexus was not satisfied, which meant that Bellas Hess prevented
remote vendors with no physical presence from collecting the market
state's use tax. Hence, the Court protected the reliance interests of
the mail order industry.
The bifurcation of nexus solved the Court's quandary of removing
impediments to Congressional legislation without removing the
existing protection for the mail order industry. This approach,
however, came with a high jurisprudential cost. It had no support in
the case law, although the Court tried to tease it from Complete Auto.'"
The Court described the "different constitutional concerns and
policies" animating the Due Process and the Commerce Clauses''
and underscored Complete Auto's use of the term "substantial nexus."
Complete Auto was a Commerce Clause case, and its use of substantial
nexus, (a term that had not appeared in any of the Court's Due
Process cases), supported, according to the Court, a different
160. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274, 289 (1977)
(Mississippi's tax "on 'the privilege of... doing business' within the [s]tate" did not
violate the Commerce Clause).
161. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (stating that the Due
Process Clause "concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity," while
the Commerce Clause's "nexus requirement" addresses "structural concerns about
the effects of state regulation on the national economy").
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meaning for nexus from that under the Due Process Clause.
Unfortunately, the Court cited no other cases to support its
approach. As two leading scholars noted, the Court's failure to cite
any other cases was not an oversight: "the Court's discovery that
'[d]espite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the
Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical' is more
accurately viewed as a doctrinal epiphany than as a logical inference
to be drawn from the careful reading of its precedents.""
Justice hiite concurred with the majority's decision to overrule
Bellas Hess's requirement of physical presence for nexus under the
Due Process Clause.'" But he viewed the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses to have the same nexus requirement and would
have given Bellas Hess "the complete burial it justly deserves."" He
scolded the majority for its unprincipled approach, noting that "[t]he
Court freely acknowledges that there is no authority for this novel
interpretation of our cases and that we have never before found, as
we do in this case, sufficient contacts for due process purposes but an
insufficient nexus under the Commerce Clause.""' Unprecedented
though it might be, this bifurcation of nexus allowed the Court to
preserve the Bellas Hess result, while removing any perceived barrier
to congressional intervention.
D. Other Flaws in the Opinion
One fundamental problem with Quill is that the Court never
explained what physical presence in a state has to do with limiting
state burdens on interstate commerce, retreating into bromides
about the value of bright lines and how they can be rough around the
edges.'"" Quill states that the Commerce Clause and the substantial
nexus requirement are informed by structural concerns about the
effects of state regulation on the national economy and limiting state
burdens on interstate commerce."7  Yet, nowhere does the Court
162. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 1 19.02 (3rd ed. 1998).
163. Quill, 504 U.S. at 321-22 (White,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Id. at 322.
165. Id. at 325.
166. Id. at 314-15 (majority opinion) (affirming the validity of Bellas Hess's bright
line rule, resulting in "commercial activity that is free from interstate taxation," while
conceding the rule "appears artificial at its edges"). Not all state courts, however,
have respected Quilts emphasis on the physical presence, bright line rule. Some
courts have applied a quantitative or qualitative test to a taxpayer's physical presence
to determine whether nexus exists. See POMP, supra note 2, at 9-157 to 9-158.
167. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-13.
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explain why the burden of collecting the use tax is reduced when a
mail-order vendor has property in the state,'16 or has engaged the
services of ten part-time, independent contractors within the state."'
A second analytical flaw in Quill is its overstatement concerning the
evolution of its due process jurisprudence. The Court asserted that
"[o]ur due process jurisprudence has evolved substantially in the
[twenty-five] years since Bellas Hess, particularly in the area ofjudicial
jurisdiction.""' But as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the
Court had held forty-two years earlier that a state's regulation of a
company that had used the United States mail to establish contacts
within the state satisfied the Due Process Clause.'' Justice Scalia
suggested that there was no difference between 'jurisdiction to
regulate and jurisdiction to tax."'
A third problem is that Quill misleadingly relies on Complete Auto's
"substantial nexus" language in support of its position that nexus for
Commerce Clause purposes is different from nexus for due process
purposes.' This dubious proposition was irrelevant in Complete Auto.
The issue in Complete Auto was whether a tax on the privilege of
doing business within a state can be applied to an activity in interstate
commerce.' The issue of nexus was not before the Court-nor
could it have been-because there was no doubt that the taxpayer,
which was transporting automobiles within Mississippi on behalf of
General Motors, had a physical presence in Mississippi.' The case is
168. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 562 (1977) (a
company's office in the market state soliciting advertisements for the company's
magazine "provide(d] a sufficient nexus" between the company and the market state).
169. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211, 213 (1960) (ten part-time
independent contractors soliciting sales in the market state establish sufficient nexus).
170. Quil4 504 U.S. at 307.
171. Id. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citing Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643,
646-50 (1950) (Virginia can require a mail-order health insurance business incorporated
in Nebraska to obtain a permit before mailing solicitations to Virginia residents)).
172. Id.; see McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1957) (noting that
courts have consistently "expand [ed] the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over
foreign corporation and nonresidents" based on the "increasing nationalization of
commerce"); People v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 427 P.2d 199, 207-09 (Cal. 1967) (en
banc) (opining that a state may regulate a business with which it has sufficient
contacts); Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, 289, 291-92 (Wis.
1966) (observing that states were given the power to regulate and tax insurance
companies by an act of Congress).
173. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-13.
174. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977).
175. Id. at 276.
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crystal clear that the taxpayer assumed it had sufficient nexus with
Mississippi,7t' and anything the Court might have said about nexus would
have been dicta at best. Complete Auto never had to address whether it
viewed nexus as a due process issue or Commerce Clause issue.
Finally, the rather cavalier way Complete Auto vacillated in its
description of the nexus requirement was inconsistent with a Court
that thought it was formulating a new Commerce Clause
interpretation of nexus. For example, only once did Complete Auto
refer to "substantial nexus";'" more often, it referred to "sufficient
nexus" or "sufficiently connected."7 Additionally, Complete Auto cited
cases referring to nexus in its more traditional due process context as
a "necessary connection,"''7 or as "sufficient nexus."" Moreover, a
computer search shows that this was the first time the Court ever used
the term "substantial nexus" in a tax case.'"' This was not a Court
that attributed any significance to the one time it used the term
"substantial nexus" in its opinion; it obviously was not imbuing that
term with any new jurisprudential meaning. As if further evidence is
even needed, in National Geographic,'" decided less than a month
after Complete Auto, the Court stated: "The question presented by this
case is whether the Society's activities at the offices in California
provided sufficient nexus between the out-of-state seller appellant and
the [s] tate-as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause-to support the imposition
upon the Society of a use-tax-collection liability."' If in Complete Auto
the use of the modifier "substantial" was purposeful rather than
casual, then the Court, without any notice, must have changed its
mind less than one month later when National Geographic was
decided. National Geographic was also quite telling in that the Court
viewed the concept of nexus as identical under both the Due
176. "Appellant, in its complaint in Chancery Court, did not allege that its activity
which Mississippi taxes does not have a sufficient nexus with the [s]tate." Id. at 277-78
(emphasis added).
177. Id. at 279.
178. See, e.g., id. at 278, 287.
179. Id. at 280-81 (citing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 271 (1946) (Rutledge,
J., concurring)).
180. Id. at 285 (citing Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959)).
181. A Westlaw search for <advanced: ("substantial nexus" & "tax")> returns only
one case decided before Complete Auto. That case, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
uses the term "substantial nexus," but in a legislative authority context.
182. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
183. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
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Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.' Nonetheless, the very
thin reed of "substantial nexus" provided the fig leaf the Court
needed from otherwise turning Quill into a transparently
unprincipled, blatantly political decision.
Although the Quill Court refused to grant certiorari on the
question of whether a decision in favor of the State would apply
retroactively,'8 5 Justice White seemed to be signaling that the Court
discussed this question at its conference.'"' That would not be
surprising because at oral argument the Court was clearly concerned
about this issue in particular and suggested that Congress was better
suited to deal with it.'1 7
The intellectually suspect bifurcation of nexus gave the Court a way
to resolve its concern about retroactivity, though it could not candidly
admit to this agenda without undermining the legitimacy of the
decision. At the same time, this suggests that the case is hardly
sacrosanct or beyond reproach, as Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
DMA well recognizes and as the 5-4 vote in Miller Brothers and the 6-3
vote in Bellas Hess also suggest.
E. The Relevance of Pre-Quill Cases on Nexus
An appreciation of the weak foundation upon which Quill is built
affects the weight that should be given to the Court's pre-Quill
decisions on nexus. Some would read such cases very narrowly,
essentially limiting them to their facts.' But neither Quill's language
nor its holding supports a narrow reading of the pre-Quill nexus cases.
184. Id.
185. Quill's petition for a writ of certiorari set forth two questions: (1) Whether
the North Dakota Supreme Court is obligated to follow the longstanding precedent
of Bellas Hess, and (2) Whether the North Dakota Supreme Court may give
retroactive effect to its decision, which is contrary to established constitutional
precedent, to make Quill liable for uncollected use taxes back toJuly 1, 1987? The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on only the first issue. State v. Quill Corp., 470
N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), cert. granted, 502 U.S. 808 (1991); see Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 332 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[W]e specifically limited the question on which certiorari was granted in
order not to consider the potential retroactive effects of overruling Bellas Hess.").
186. Quill, 504 U.S. at 332-33.
187. See Oral Argument, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, No, 91-194, 1992 WL 687848
(Jan. 22, 1992). Through conversations with the then-North Dakota Tax
Commissioner, Heidi Heitkamp, this Author learned that after the oral argument,
the state realized it was vulnerable on the retroactivity issue. It considered getting
affidavits from all of the sales tax states stating that they would not apply any decision in
their favor retroactively. There simply was not enough time to implement this strategy.
188. See infra notes 189, 191, 208.
[Vol. 65:11151148
2016] REVISITING MILLER BROTHERS, BELLAS HESS, AND QUILL
In addition, some critics would reject pre-Quill cases decided under
the Due Process Clause as having no relevance in a post-Quill world
where nexus has been bifurcated." Again, they offer no support for
this position from the language or the holding of Quill.
Those views are a logically possible, but improbable reading of the
Court's intent in Quill. As discussed above, Quill added no new nexus
requirement for use taxes. Nor did Quill invigorate the existing
physical presence precedents. The majority and concurrence
claimed they were preserving the physical presence test of Bellas Hess
because of their adherence to stare decisis.Y1o There is not even a
hint in Quill that the Court, in doing so, was repudiating all of its
many cases that gave content to that test. Indeed, to read Quill as
some radical decision-a voyage into uncharted waters-is to treat
the Court's stated concern for stare decisis as claptrap. A court
concerned with preserving existing expectations and providing a
bright-line, physical presence test for nexus should not be read as
having discarded existing nexus jurisprudence unless it has made an
explicit statement to that effect.
Those who would read Quill as rejecting its earlier cases on nexus
are left with the task of examining all prior decisions to determine
which of those were decided under the Commerce or Due Process
Clause. This task is hopeless. Prior to Quill, the Court never had any
reason to specify whether a nexus decision was grounded on one
clause or the other."" Accordingly, the Court could be somewhat
189. See, e.g., Kendall L. Houghton & Douglas Lindholm, COST Opposes MTC Nexus
Bulletin 95-1, 10 ST. TAx NoTEs 973, 974 (1996) (rejecting the Bulletin's reliance on
Scripto and Tyler Pipe, arguing that those cases "stand for due process nexus
principles, not Commerce Clause principles, and thus cannot serve as binding
precedent" (emphasis added)). The authors acknowledge elsewhere, however, that
Tyler Pipe "does not designate the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause as
grounds for its nexus holding" but argues that Tyler Pipe should be characterized as a
due process case. Id. at 975 (emphasis added).
As further evidence that nothing about Commerce Clause nexus can be teased from
Complete Auto, Tyler Pipe, decided ten year later, uses the term "sufficient nexus" and
never uses the term "substantial nexus." Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 240, 249-50 (1987).
MTC Nexus Bulletin 95-1 addresses whether warranty services provided by a seller
through another party can constitute nexus for the seller with states in which the
services are performed. See Houghton & Lindholm, supra, at 973.
190. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314; id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
191. See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue of Wash., 419 U.S.
560, 562, 564 (1975) (referencing both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 ("As in a number of other cases involving the
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casual about the grounds of its decisions, often suggesting that nexus
was required by both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause, without even hinting that the concept did not have the same
meaning under both clauses.'" Nothing in Quill-or in any other
case, even Complete Auto-suggests that physical presence had a
different meaning under the Due Process Clause than under the
Commerce Clause. Quill does not define physical presence, nor does
the Court indicate that it is reexamining, let alone overruling, the
definition of physical presence that emerges from those due process
cases that found nexus because of a physical presence.
F The Meaning of Physical Presence
The term "physical presence" cannot be applied literally to a
corporation, which is a legal construct with no physical attributes.
Unlike an individual, who can be physically present in a state, a
corporation can be physically present only indirectly, through, for
example, some person or property with which it has a legal relationship.
The ownership or leasing of real property is one way in which a
corporation can be present in a state.'" A corporation can also be
physically present in a state through persons acting on its behalf.'
application of state taxing statutes to out-of-state sellers, our holding in Bellas Hess
relied on both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause."); Nat'l Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967) (the "two claims are closely
related"); Houghton & Lindholm, supra note 189, at 975 (arguing that Standard
Pressed Steel was predominantly about the Due Process Clause and that some pre-Quill
cases "do[] not designate the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause as
grounds for its nexus holding"). But see Quill, 504 U.S. at 314 (suggesting that
Standard Pressed Steel was a "Commerce Clause decision[]").
192. E.g., Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 554
(1977) (stating that: "The question presented by this case is whether the Society's
activities at the offices in California provided sufficient nexus . .. as required by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause"); see
also Quill, 504 U.S. at 304 (describing Bellas Hess as relying on both the Due Process
Clause and the Commerce Clause; presumably both clauses required physical
presence until the Quill Court bifurcated the meaning of nexus). The Court
recognized that its recent Commerce Clause "cases involved taxpayers who had a
physical presence in the taxing [s]tate." Quill, 504 U.S. at 314.
193. No one doubts that the ownership of real or tangible property constitutes physical
presence. The Court, however, has never had an opportunity to address whether nexus can
be avoided by transferring such ownership to a controlled entity. For a discussion of this
technique, known as entity isolation, see PoMP, supra note 2, at 9-71 to 9-74.
194. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) ("Since the
corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as
though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual its 'presence' without, as
well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in
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Under the case law, a corporation would have physical presence in a
state through the actions of an individual soliciting or selling in a state
on its behalf. For example, traveling salespersons who are employees of
an out-of-state vendor provide nexus for the employer.'
The employer-employee relationship is one polar point on a
continuum of possible personal relationships. At the other end of
that continuum are the employees of common carriers or of the U.S.
Postal Service, whose actions would not be attributed to the
corporation. As Quill held, mail-order sellers "who do no more than
communicate with customers in the [s]tate by mail or common
carrier" will not have nexus."'
Of course, employees are only one category of individuals who can
be physically present within the state. The in-state actions of agents
and independent contractors can also confer nexus. While the case
law does not establish all of the relevant boundary lines, it is clear
that an independent contractor does not have to work exclusively for
the out-of-state corporation to confer nexus. In Scripto, for example,
the Court held that nexus was created by ten part-time, independent
contractors making commissions on the orders they solicited.'"
The Quill Court described Scripto as "[t]he furthest extension" of
the Due Process Clause's requirement that there be a minimum
its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so
far 'present' there as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or
the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to
be decided. For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those
activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be
sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process." (citations omitted)).
195. Query whether it makes a difference what the employee is doing. The easiest
case for nexus is where the employee is selling or soliciting sales, that is, taking
money out of a state, on behalf of an out-of-state vendor. A state tax commissioner
would clearly seek to make the vendor collect use taxes and no case has held that
such an employee would not constitute nexus. But suppose the employee is buying
inventory from manufacturers in the state, and is thus injecting money into the local
economy. A state tax commissioner will be hesitant about treating this situation as
creating nexus, for fear of driving purchasers to more nexus-friendly states. A tax
commissioner may be similarly lenient with respect to an out-of-state company
engaging independent contractors, such as lawyers and accountants. A tax
commissioner taking the position that the use of a local law firm constitutes nexus is
unlikely to remain commissioner for very long. Consequently, there are few cases-
and no Supreme Court cases-on point. On the other hand, the holding in National
Geographic suggests that real property constitutes nexus regardless of what it is used for.
Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 554. The parallel treatment of employees would mean
that employees would constitute nexus regardless of what they are used for.
196. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
197. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 209, 212-13 (1960).
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connection.'" Critics have latched onto this language to conclude
that solicitation is a necessary condition for nexus.""' Nothing in
Scripto, however, held that the activities at- issue were the only activities
that could establish nexus. The statement in Scripto regarding
solicitation is nothing more than an illustration of a sufficient
condition for nexus, not a necessary one.200 Further, in
subsequent cases, the Court held that individuals did not
necessarily need to engage in solicitation, but could engage in
other activities to establish physical presence within the taxing
state, thereby rejecting a crabbed reading of Scripto.2 1
Quill's description of Scripto as "[t]he furthest extension "202 of the
law was a neutral descriptive statement. It means what it says-that
Scripto extended what constituted sufficient nexus, beyond where it
stood in previous cases before the Court. No basis exists for the
position some commentators have taken that the Court, in making
that statement, was "intimating that courts in the intervening [thirty-
six] years have moved the other way."20s
That interpretation is inconsistent with Quill's eliminating the
physical presence requirement under the Due Process Clause. That
is, Quill extends the law substantially further than Scripto by holding
that no physical presence is needed to provide nexus under the Due
Process Clause. In other words, if Scripto is a due process case, as
these commentators maintain, how could Quill be read as intimating
that courts in the intervening years have moved away from Scripto, when
Quill itself reversed this so-called "trend" by totally eliminating the physical
presence requirement as a precondition to satisfying due process? Nor is
the Court seriously suggesting that nine independent contractors would
not be enough to constitute nexus, but that ten would be.
198. Quill 504 U.S. at 306.
199. See, e.g., George S. Isaacson & Martin I. Eisenstein, MTC Nexus Bulletin 95-1
Goes Beyond Existing Law, 10 ST. TAX NoTEs 1168, 1169 (1996); see also Houghton &
Lindholm, supra note 189, at 975.
200. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 211-12.
201. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 233
(1987); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 562-64 (1975);
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 447 (1964).
202. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306.
203. Houghton & Lindholm, supra note 189, at 975. In fairness, they made that
statement twenty years ago and may no longer subscribe to it. (It is unclear what
thirty-six years refers to because only thirty-two years elapsed between Scripto, decided
in 1960, and Quill, decided in 1992.)
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Other categories, all resulting in a finding of nexus, include a
general agent," a sales representative, or a jobber, broker, or
independent contractor,"' at least in circumstances where the in-state
person would be understood as acting on behalf of the vendor. No
reason exists to believe the Court will interpret these categories
narrowly. The Court has never suggested that it was using terms such
as "agent" or "representative" in a narrow, technical sense, or that
such terms were to be defined under state law. If anything, the Court
has indicated that labels and "fine distinction[s]" of nomenclature
will have no "constitutional significance.""2 7
In addition, the Court has described quite broadly the activities of
in-state persons who will constitute a physical presence for out-of-state
vendors. For example, the Court has held that a corporation has a
physical presence if the person acting on its behalf has performed
activities significantly associated with the corporation's ability to
establish and maintain the in-state market,"24  or made it possible
for the company to realize and continue "valuable contractual
relations" with its customers."')
The Court's broad view is consistent with its emphasis on substance
rather than form in its Commerce Clause cases and on pragmatism
204. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 64, 67-68 (1939). Besides
the presence of two general agents in Felt & Tarrant, the company paid the rent of
an office for each of them.
205. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 249-50.
206. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 209 (1960).
207. Id. at 211.
208. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 250 (finding that nexus existed through sales
representatives who provided Tyler Pipe with virtually all their information regarding
the Washington market, including: product performance; competing products;
pricing, market conditions and trends; existing and upcoming construction
products; customer financial liability; and other critical information of a local
nature); see Isaacson & Eisenstein, supra note 199, at 1169 (dismissing Tyler Pipe's
"ability to maintain a market" language as "the applicable test. As the Supreme Court
made clear in Quill, what is required to create nexus is a 'physical presence' and that
requires a 'small sales force, plant, or office"'). Isaacson and Eisenstein convert a
sufficient condition of nexus into a necessary one. The language they quote out of
context simply provides a brief summary of some of the relevant precedent. It
cannot be fairly read as the Court's rejection ahead of time of all the possible fact
patterns that might constitute nexus. If the reading suggested by Isaacson and
Eisenstein were correct-that what is required for nexus is limited to a small sales
force, plant, or office-then a mine, a television tower, a server farm, and who knows
what else-would not constitute nexus, an absurd view. Perhaps Isaacson and
Eisenstein have changed their views since 1996 when they wrote their article.
209. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 561-62 (1975).
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rather than formalism, as clearly expressed in Complete Auto.210 The
Court's willingness to treat employees, agents, independent contractors,
and representatives as constituting physical presence under appropriate
conditions is an example of its pragmatic philosophy of focusing on
economic reality and practical effects and not on labels.
The Court's emphasis on substance over form was the key to its
holding in Complete Auto, but predates that case. In 1960, for
example, the Scripto Court expressly recognized that the artificial
distinction between "regular employees of [Scriptol devoting full
time to its service" and independent contractors is "a fine
distinction . . . without constitutional significance."2"' The Court was
also sensitive to the tax avoidance opportunities that would arise if it
were to draw such a distinction, noting that "[t] o permit such formal
'contractual shifts' to make a constitutional difference would open
the gates to a stampede of tax avoidance."212 This suggests that the
Court will not -interpret its prior cases on physical presence in a
narrow or wooden manner, but rather that it will acknowledge that
legal relationships often will not fall into traditional employer-
employee categories, especially true in a world where outsourcing is
becoming increasingly common.
Furthermore, the Court has demonstrated an appreciation of, and
sensitivity to, the tax avoidance opportunities that can arise from
drawing fine distinctions in contractual arrangements. For example,
the Scripto Court would be unlikely to tolerate a different nexus result
if a corporation eliminates an in-house department and then
outsources that previous function to independent contractors, some
of whom may have been its former employees." In other words,
firing employees and rehiring them as independent contractors is
unlikely to break the nexus connection.
V. REVISITING QUILL: THOUGHTS FROM THE SYMPOSIUM
How different the history of the Court's jurisprudence might have
been had Miller Brothers held for Maryland, at least with respect to the
deliveries made to its residents. The "cash-and-carry sales" proved to
be a small tail that wagged a big dog in the hands of a hostile Justice
like Justice Jackson. Even without those sales, Justice Jackson's
hostility to Maryland's arguments, as illustrated by his hyperbolic and
210. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281-89 (1977)
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erroneous statements about the nature of the use tax, and his
mischaracterization of the deliveries by Miller Brothers, doomed
Maryland's case. Professor Cox was able to use Miller Brothers to
influence the Bellas Hess majority over a stinging dissent hat reads as
if it could have been written today. And what a shaky precedent Bellas
Hess was for the Quill Court, which not only was concerned with the
issue of retroactivity on which certiorari was specifically not granted,
but also had to invent a new theory of nexus to implement its
political agenda. The Court candidly admits its ambivalence about its
decision and essentially punts the issue to Congress, which has yet to
act. Meanwhile, the digital age makes the opinion seem quaint and
atavistic. No wonder Justice Kennedy's frustration spilled over into
his concurrence in DMA.
A. The Main Show
The authors of the remaining articles in this issue would overrule
Quill but they also offer strategies that would accommodate the
case."' The next article, Beyond Quill and Congress: The Necessity of
Sales Tax Enforcement and the Invention of a New Approach by Lila Disque
and Helen Hecht,'15 is a gem. It is historical and descriptive, as well
as prescriptive with a tad of whimsy;" and best of all, it proposes a
strategy that might be a real game changer. Building on Colorado's
success in Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl,17 the authors propose that states
adopt statutes that would allow them to obtain information on taxable
sales from remote sellers and send notices to instate consumers allowing
them to pay, contest, or have the tax withheld by their employer.
A variation of this would be for the employers to make an
estimated withholding through payroll deductions based on the
preceding year's data that would be sent to instate purchasers; the
current data, when available, would then be used by the purchasers to
"true up" the withholding and either claim refunds or pay additional
tax at the end of the year when they file their returns.
214. Portions of this section stem from the Author's previous work. POMP, supra
note 2, at 6-6 to 6-7.
215. Lila Disque & Helen Hecht, Beyond Quill and Congress: The Necessity of Sales
Tax Enforcement and the Invention of a New Approach, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1163 (2016).
216. Who knew (or remembered), for example, that the first on-line purchase
occurred in 1994 and was for a pepperoni pizza with mushrooms and extra cheese
from Pizza Hut. See Kate Taylor, Pizza Hut Offers Big Discount to Celebrate 20th
Anniversary of the World's First Online Purchase, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 3, 2014),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/230620.
217. 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016).
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The authors' proposal would require the vendor to determine the
taxable status of the purchases. The statute challenged in Direct
Marketing Ass'n requires only determining the amount of purchases
by dollar amounts, without regard to their taxable status.""
Requiring the remote vendor to educate itself about a state's sales tax
sufficient to make a decision about taxability could lay the foundation
for subsequent litigation.
The authors also describe the kind of table used by California,
Maine, and other states, which estimates by adjusted gross income the
amount of use tax owed on out-of-state purchases.22' These states
allow taxpayers to report use tax based either on their actual
purchases and records or by using these tables.2 ' According to the
authors, compliance rates under this system are uneven. Lookup
tables are worthy of further refinement222 and may be an alternative
to the authors' proposed Colorado approach.
The American University Law Review also had panels at its
Symposium dealing with the value added tax (VAT). When the Law
Review put the Symposium together, it could not have anticipated that
218. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-21-112(3.5) (c) (1), 39-21-112(3.5) (d) (I)-(II). (West
2016) (requiring retailers that fail to collect sales tax to (1) inform purchasers "that
sales or use tax is due on certain purchases"; (2) send the purchasers an annual
reminder to pay sales or use tax accompanied by the "dates of purchases, the amounts of
each purchase, and the category of the purchase"; and (3) send the Colorado
Department of Revenue an "annual statement for each purchaser.. . showing the total
amount paid for Colorado purchases"); Direct Mktg. Ass'n, 814 F.3d at 1134.
219. Disque and Hecht's proposal might be easiest to implement in states that are
members of the Streamlined Sales Tax Project. These states are Arkansas, Georgia,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. State
Info, STREAMLINE SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC.,
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=state-info (last visited May 17,
2016). Notably, Colorado is not a member. Id.
220. Disque & Hecht, supra note 215, at 1179-180; see Use Tax Collection on Income
Tax Returns-Reporting and Collections, JUX LAW FIRM, http://thompsonhall.com/use-
tax-collection-on-income-tax-returns-reporting-and-collections (last visited May 17,
2016); see also POMP, supra note 2, at 6-42 n.183 (noting that Maine uses the same
table for calculating sales taxes). None of the states using this approach adjust the
estimated use tax by the age of the taxpayer, which would seem to be a relevant
factor because the elderly are less likely to buy over the Internet compared with
younger groups. See Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns-Reporting and Collections,
supra (indicating that the lookup table method for establishing use tax liability relies
solely on adjusted gross income).
221. Make Online Purchases? You May Owe Use Tax, CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUAUZATION,
https://www.boe.ca.gov/info/usetax _table.html (last visited May 17, 2016).
222. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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Senator Ted Cruz would actually propose a VAT as part of his plan to
reform the federal tax system." Once again, subsequent events
vindicated the Law Review's good judgment.
The VAT, or what is essentially its equivalent-a national sales or
consumption tax collected in stages-is "the most studied tax system
that has never been seriously considered by Congress. "22" Taxes on
consumption have played an important role in the fiscal history of
the United States. Before the Civil War, customs duties were a major
source of federal revenue.2 2 5  The first movement for a general
federal sales tax in the United States arose during the Civil War and
reflected dissatisfaction with the new wartime income tax and the
wide range of excise taxes (national sales taxes limited to specific
commodities) that had also been imposed."2 Congress rejected a
proposed one percent sales tax in 1862.2
From the Civil War through World War I, customs duties and
excise taxes were equally important.228 A second movement for a
national sales tax occurred immediately after World War I, motivated
again by opposition to high wartime income taxes.2 1" A bill providing
for a federal sales tax was defeated in 1918." In 1921, a proposal for
a personal consumption tax was rejected, as were proposals for
various forms of sales taxes."' Proposals for a federal sales tax were
renewed, again unsuccessfully, during the Great Depression, with
223. Len Burman, Ted Cruzs Business Flat Tax Is a VAT, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2016, 5:13
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2016/01/15/ted-cruzs-business-flat-tax-
is-a-vat/#6eee4cd9580f (explaining the characteristics that categorize Ted Cruz's tax
proposal as a VAT).
224. Alan Schenk, Prior US. Flirtations with VAT, inTHE VAT READER 52, 52 (2011),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/freefiles.nsf/Files/SCHENK-
4.pdf/$file/SCHENK-4.pdf.
225. See The Civil War, TAXANALYSTh, http://www.taxhistoty.org/www/website.nsf/web/
THM1861?OpenDocument (last visited May 17, 2016) (explaining that "[clustoms
duties amounted to about $75 million annually"); see also POMP, supra note 2, at 6-6.
226. Pomp, supra note 2, at 6-6; Schenk, supra note 224, at 53.
227. POMP, supra note 2, at 6-6.
228. Histoy of the US Tax System, ALMANAC OF POL'Y ISSUES,
http://www.policyalmanac.org/economic/archive/tax-history.shtml (last visited
May 17, 2016) (indicating that "[flrom 1868 to 1913, almost [ninety] percent of all
revenue was collected from the remaining excises"); see also POMP, supra note 2, at 6-6.
229. See History of Federal General Sales Tax Proposals, TAxANALYSTs,
http://www.taxhistory.org/civilization/Documents/Sales/HST29005/hst29005(a).h
tm (last visited May 17, 2016).
230. See id. (noting that Senator Borah presented the bill "before the Senate
Finance Committee on the Revenue Act of 1918").
231. See id. (recounting that Senator Reed Smoot proposed several sales tax
schemes to the Senate Finance Committee, all of which were rejected).
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famed newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst as the most
outspoken proponent.32 From 1933 to 1936, excise taxes again became
a major source of federal revenue, but their relative importance later
declined with increasing reliance upon the income tax. 3
To finance World War II, the government considered, but
ultimately rejected, a sales tax and personal expenditure tax; instead,
the war was financed by income, excess-profits, and excise taxes.23 1
Excise taxes were similarly used to finance the Korean War.35 The
last vestiges of these wartime excises were generally eliminated in
1965, although the United States still imposes a wide variety of excise
taxes on certain goods and services, such as alcoholic beverages,
tobacco products, motor fuels, heavy tires and trucks, coal, pistols
and revolvers, sports and fishing equipment, domestic air
transportation, and breweries.3
President Nixon considered a VAT in part to help finance
education.237 Mayors and governors, who realized that a VAT wasjust
a diffi'rent means of administering a retail sales tax-which they
coveted as their own, unshared revenue source-vehemently opposed
President Nixon's proposal.3
In 1971, the American Bar Association charged a special group to
study the VAT, as did the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.239 Proposals for a federal VAT were considered by the
232. See BEN PROCTER, WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST: THE LATER YEARS, 1911-1951,
at 96 (2007) (noting that, to "spur Congress to action," Hearst offered members of
Congress an all-expenses-paid trip to Canada to witness its national sales tax in
action); see also POMP, supra note 2, at 6-6.
233. SeeJoseph J. Thorndike, Four Things that Everyone Should Know About New Deal
Taxation, TAXANALS7s (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/
ArtWeb/1AEBAA68B74ABB918525750CO046BCAF?OpenDocument (stating that excise
taxes constituted "anywhere from a third to half of federal revenue throughout the
1930s"); see also History of the US Tax System, supra note 228 (recounting that the personal
income tax drastically increased prior and during World War II).
234. See THE TAX FOUNDATION, FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES 17-18 (1956),
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/pn40-1.pdf
(providing specific examples of excise taxes implemented to fund World War II).
235. Id. at 18; see also POMP, supra note 2, at 6-6.
236. See Excise Tax, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/excise-tax (last visited May 17, 2016) (defining excise tax); Tax and Fee
Rates, ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX & TRADE BUREAU, https://www.ttb.gov/tax-audit/
atftaxes.shtml (last visited May 17, 2016) (publishing tax rates for various forms of
alcohol, tobacco products, and firearms); see also POMP, supra note 2, at 6-6.
237. Schenk, supra note 224, at 53.
238. See id. (noting the prevailing opposition to President Nixon's VAT proposal).
239. Id. at 54.
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Treasury in the early 1970's and formed a major part of the
Treasury's famous 1984 tax reform study.241  But the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations essentially killed
interest in a VAT when it concluded that "a massive new [flederal
program designed specifically to bring about property tax relief is
neither necessary nor desirable." "
In 1995 and 1996, proposals for variations of a consumption tax,
sales tax, or VAT figured prominently in the inevitable political
jockeying preceding the presidential election, but none was ever
adopted.' None of these earlier sweeping proposals generated any
depth of support in the 2000, 2004, or 2008 presidential campaigns.
In his first term beginning in 2008, President Obama indicated
interest in a VAT to deal with the country's large deficits, but he
never made it a priority.2' 1"
One of the lessons that politicians seem to have drawn from the
lukewarm reception the VAT has received is to avoid calling it that,
which brings us back to Senator Cruz. He has proposed a "Business
Flat Tax," but the cognoscenti recognize it as tax-inclusive
subtraction-method VAT.
To understand what that means, we are all in good hands. The
iconic Professor Walter Hellerstein has contributed Taxing Remote
Sales in the Digital Age: A Global Perspective to this Issue.1 ' Anything by
Professor Hellerstein is worth reading, and this Article is no
exception. This is as good a primer on the VAT as anyone can read:
perceptive, subtle, and insightful.
240. KATHRYN JAMES, THE RISE OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAx 345 (2015) (indicating
that, although President Nixon tasked the Treasury with evaluating the VAT
proposal, the Treasury conducted its own separate and private study); 3 OFFICE OF
THE SEC'Y, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
EcONOMIc GROWrH (1984) (dedicating the entire volume to addressing a VAT).
241. AD11SORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE VALUE-ADDED TAX
AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FEDERAL REVENUE iii (1973),
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/information/m-78.pdf.
242. POMP, supra note 2, at 6-7; John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax,
Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of
Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 2095, 2111 & n.52, 2117-18 (2000).
243. POMP, supra note 2, at 6-7; Obama Leaves Value-Added Tax on Table, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 22, 2010, 2:06 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-leaves-value-added-
tax-on-table.
244. Alan Cole, Ted Cruz's "Business Flat Tax": A Primer, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 29,
2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/ted-cruz-s-business-flat-tax-primer; see Burman,
supra note 223.
245. Walter Hellerstein, Taxing Remote Sales in the Digital Age: A Global Perspective,
65 AM. U. L. REV. 1195 (2016).
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Applying a global perspective based on his long experience with
the VAT, Professor Hellerstein draws three fundamental lessons: (1)
remote sales should be taxed under a consumption tax like the states'
retail sales taxes or a VAT, (2) remote sales should be taxed using a
destination principle under a retail sales tax or a VAT, and (3)
remote sales can be taxed by adopting simplified registration and
compliance regimes for nonresident vendors and by adopting a
feature familiar to VATs but uncommon in a retail sales tax: the
reverse charge mechanism.
Turning to the theme of this Symposium, Professor Hellerstein
calls for, with his quintessential wordsmithing, "jettison [ing] the
archaic rule of Quill, . . . a self-inflicted wound that can be easily
repaired with congressional surgery.""'
A VAT may have advantages over a retail sales tax, but as Professor
Richard Ainsworth makes clear, preventing fraud is not one of them.
He has consistently been ahead of the curve in raising warnings about
how technology can be (and is) manipulated to commit fraud, in
both the VAT and the retail sales tax.
Professor Ainsworth was the first American scholar to raise the
rallying cry against the use of zappers or suppressors, long before the
public, including most state tax administrators, had ever heard of
them. These are computer programs, installed using a thumb drive
on point of sale electronic cash registers, which erase and
permanently delete a percentage of gross receipts.4 7  The program
can be customized to the particular needs of a user. Professor
Ainsworth has been a one-person bandwagon, cajoling and coaxing
the states to take defensive measures, and some, but not enough,
have heard his warning.
His Symposium Article, Sales Suppression-The International
Dimension,m provides chilling accounts of criminal prosecutions in
Canada, where zappers have been used before they apparently spread
to the United States, especially to the West Coast. Similar
prosecutions are now following in the United States and are
colorfully detailed by Professor Ainsworth, who could easily have
246. Id. at 1237.
247. Richard Ainsworth, California Zappers: A Proposal for California's Commission on
the 21st Century Economy, (B.U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-01, 2009).
248. R v. InfoSpec Sys., Inc., 2013 B.C.C.A. 333, paras. 6-7 (British Columbia Ct.
App. 2013) (explaining that the Profitek Zapper manufactured by InfoSpec can be
easily customized).
249. Richard Ainsworth, Sales Suppression: The International Dimension, 65 Am. U. L.
REv. 1241 (2016).
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another career writing crime thrillers. Professor Ainsworth
criticizes the FBI's focus on the end user of the zappers and
contrasts that approach with the Washington Attorney General,
who focused on the salesmen, installers, and service providers of
zapper technology in Washington State.
After regaling the reader with prosecutions in Canada and the
United States, Professor Ainsworth distills the lessons that should be
learned. Taxing jurisdictions need to have technology that
reconstructs the digital transaction records that have been
suppressed, or need to have technology that encrypts and saves
digital records at the time of their creation. Professor Ainsworth's
preference is for "real-time secure transmission of encrypted
transactional data to a central location where artificial intelligence
(Al) conducts a high quality risk analysis."" Technology exists that
would accomplish this and could be mandated by statute.
Through his writings and speeches, Professor Ainsworth has
prompted states to adopt legislation to deal with zappers, but attacks
some of these statutes as allowing for warrantless searches and seizures.
He also criticizes statutes that make the salesmen and manufacturers of
suppression devices liable for the lost taxes as estimated by a tax
department. Because the zappers erase transactional data,
reconstructing tax losses is difficult. He is concerned that salesmen and
manufacturers cannot challenge a tax department's estimates because
that process is cloaked in taxpayer confidentiality.
This Issue of the Law Review provides a treasure trove of analysis
and support for overturning Quill. Even if that were not to happen,
the authors propose strategies for: coping with Quill, minimizing its
precedential value, and narrowing its holding; improving the
administration of the sales tax; using DMA as a springboard for
collecting the use tax; and perhaps even adopting a VAT. The Law
Review is to be complimented for assembling a broad and
comprehensive resource for judges, lawyers, and policymakers.
250. Id. at 1266-267(citations omitted).
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